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In recent years we have seen continued widespread privatisation of
state-owned organisations across theworld. Portugal has not been alien
to this tendency and has witnessed several privatisation initiatives in
different industries, such as banking, telecommunications, energy, post-
al services and hotels. However, the impact of these initiatives on ﬁrms'
performance remains to be fully understood.
Investigating the impact of privatisation on performance is relevant
because it is proposed that, if certain conditions are met, privatisation
triggers change in the organisation, leading to improved performance
(Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny, 1996; Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000).
When one is interested in studying the aggregate level of perfor-
mance of an organisation or of a group of organisations, onemay calcu-
late its level of productivity and its level of production efﬁciency
(Cooper, Seiford & Tone, 2000). Productivity and production efﬁciency
are related concepts, but have different meanings. Total factor produc-
tivity is a ratio of the weighted sum of outputs to the weighted sum of
inputs (Cooper, Seiford & Tone, 2000). Production efﬁciency is a mea-
sure of the distance to the best practice production frontier, given the
current level of technology (Cooper, Seiford & Tone, 2000). When we
want to evaluate total factor productivity change, we need an index
that accounts for two effects: the efﬁciency change effect and the fron-
tier shift effect (Tone, 2004).ntos@ualg.pt (S.P. Santos),A comprehensive review of the literature regarding the effects of
privatisation on performance, undertaken by Megginson and Netter
(2001), concluded that, whilst there is some evidence that
privatisation improves performance, this evidence also suggests
that this improvement is limited to certain indicators, andmay affect
negatively some stakeholders. Furthermore, the analysis of the liter-
ature also suggests that most studies have focused on the impact of
privatisation on production efﬁciency, without paying due attention
to the potential frontier shifts that may have taken place after
privatisation.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), developed by Charnes, Cooper
and Rhodes (1978), is one of themost extensively used non-parametric
techniques for measuring the production efﬁciency of homogeneous
units. Although it was initially proposed to evaluate organisational efﬁ-
ciency, several studies have shown that this technique can also be useful
in evaluating efﬁciency in speciﬁc management areas, such as market-
ing (see, for example, Dutta, Kamakura & Ratchford, 2004; Donthu,
Hershberger & Osmonbekov, 2005; Luo & Donthu, 2005) and ﬁnance
(see, for example, Psillaki, Tsolas & Margarities, 2010; Lamb & Tee,
2012). For a recent survey on DEA applications the reader is referred
to Liu, Lu, Lu and Lin (2013).
Despite the fact that several studies have used DEA to evaluate the
performance of hotels and to investigate the determinants of perfor-
mance (please refer to reviews undertaken by Assaf & Josiassen, 2015
and by Santos & Amado, 2014), to the best of our knowledge, no study
has used this technique to analyse the impact of privatisation on the ef-
ﬁciency and/or the productivity of hotels. The study by Assaf and
Cvelbar (2011) is the only published study that has investigated the
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used the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) technique and the Cobb-
Douglas and Translog functions to analyse expenses and sales in a sam-
ple of hotels. Based on the results of the analysis, they concluded that
privatisation had a positive impact on the efﬁciency of Slovenian hotels
and called for further studies of the accommodation industry. However,
Assaf and Cvelbar (2011) did not study whether signiﬁcant frontier
shifts took place after privatisation and this is an important aspect to ex-
plore when studying the impact of privatisation.
This article aims to contribute to this body of literature by testing
six research hypotheses regarding the impact of partial privatisation
on the performance of hotels. In order to test these hypotheses,
we use the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to compare
the performance results after privatisation with those before
privatisation. The hypotheses are tested with data from a chain of
heritage hotels operating in Portugal, which was partially privatised
in 2003. Since 2003, 49% of the capital of this chain became private
and the chain is privately managed by a multinational group: Grupo
Pestana Pousadas (GPP). A balanced panel of data from 2001 to
2010 was used in order to evaluate the impact of privatisation in
terms of technological change, efﬁciency, total factor productivity
and individual performance ratios.
By testing these hypotheses, this research makes the following con-
tributions to the literature:
(1) By applying DEA to a panel set of data for a chain of enterprises
we contribute to a better understanding of the impact of partial
privatisation on organisational performance. Whilst most of the
previous studies have only been able to undertake longitudinal
analysis for a single company or had to combine data from com-
panies in different countries and/or different industries, our
study combines cross-sectional analysis with longitudinal analy-
sis for a group of units belonging to the same industry and all
privatised at the same time. This allows us to evaluate changes
in total factor productivity, distinguishing between changes in
the best practice frontier and changes in the efﬁciency of the in-
dividual units. This is an important contribution as analysing
solely efﬁciency changes is insufﬁcient to obtain a full under-
standing of the impact of privatisation on ﬁrms' performance as
signiﬁcant frontier shifts may occur.
(2) Considering that some studies have shown that not all perfor-
mance dimensions improve after privatisation, we complement
the total factor productivity analysis with a ratio analysis. By in-
vestigating changes in six relevant performance ratios we are
able to identify the areas most affected by privatisation, as well
as the direction of the changes.
(3) To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that inves-
tigates the impact of privatisation on total factor productivity
in the accommodation industry. By calculating the Malmquist
Productivity Indices and their components before and after
privatisation, we are able to study the impact of privatisation
on total factor productivity and on each of its components.
The remainder of this paper is structured in six sections, as follows.
Section 2 overviews the theoretical arguments and the empirical litera-
ture regarding the impact of privatisation on performance and sets the
research hypotheses. Section 3 provides the background for the study,
discussing the main characteristics of the hotel chain studied and the
justiﬁcation of its appropriateness to test the hypotheses. In Section 4
we discuss the methods used. In Section 5, we discuss the development
of the DEA model used in this study, present summary statistics for the
data used and present the results obtained. Section 6 discusses the re-
sults and the main contributions of this study, and Section 7 presents
the main limitations of the study and provides suggestions for future
research.2. Theory, literature review and hypotheses development
2.1. Impact of privatisation on total factor productivity
As discussed by Chirwa (2001), there are several theoretical frame-
works that support the view that private ownership is associated with
better performance than public ownership. Chirwa (2001) discusses
four arguments. Firstly, the property rights theory together with the
principal-agent theory emphasise that the distance between the tax-
payer and themanager of state-owned organisationsmakesmonitoring
more difﬁcult and weakens the incentives for cost-minimisation. Sec-
ondly, the public choice theory suggests that state-owned enterprises
pursue political objectives, such asmaximisation of votes, employment,
investment and budget control, which tend to lead to inefﬁciency.
Thirdly, organisational theories argue that speciﬁc organisational char-
acteristics of public enterprises (such as different management styles
and organisational structures) tend to lead to inefﬁciency. Lastly, the
soft budget constraint argument suggests that public enterprises, unlike
private ones, are able to survivewith prolonged losses given the govern-
ment subsidies.
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) present a theory of
privatisation as a strategy to reduce the inefﬁciency of public enter-
prises. Several studies have empirically studied the impact of
privatisation on the production efﬁciency of enterprises. These stud-
ies have used mainly two methods: (1) the parametric approach
with SFA and (2) the non-parametric approach with DEA. Consider-
ing the advantages of DEA over SFA, in particular its ability to handle
multiple inputs and multiple outputs without the need to specify a
functional form for the production function, in this study we focus
on the non-parametric approach with DEA.
We identiﬁed 17 studies that have used DEA to study the impact of
privatisation on the production efﬁciency and/or the total factor pro-
ductivity of ﬁrms. Table S1 in the supplementary material offers a syn-
thesis of these studies, including information regarding the context
and period of analysis, the methodology used and the main conclusions
reached. This table has been split into two sections: Section 1 includes
11 studies that have investigated the impact of privatisation on produc-
tion efﬁciency, and Section 2 includes six studies that have investigated
the impact of privatisation on total factor productivity.
When we examine the information presented in Section 1 of Table
S1 we ﬁnd evidence that privatisation had a positive impact on the pro-
duction efﬁciency of different companies, including: British Airways,
British Gas and Associated British Ports (Boussoﬁane, Martin & Parker,
1997), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (Sueyoshi,
1998), a number of manufacturing enterprises in Malawi (Chirwa,
2001), a sample of German hospitals (Tiemann & Schreyögg, 2012)
and a sample of international airports (Assaf & Gillen, 2012).
Despite the fact that improvements in production efﬁciency have
been found in several different industries, somenotes of caution regard-
ing the difﬁculty in attributing these improvements solely to
privatisation have been voiced in the literature. For example, despite
observing positive impacts from full privatisation of the airports under
certain conditions, Assaf and Gillen (2012) emphasised that deregula-
tion appears to be more important than privatisation in order to im-
prove airport efﬁciency.
Other notes of caution come from studies that found evidence of an-
ticipation effects rather than privatisation effects. In these studies it was
concluded that performance improved in the years immediately before
privatisation, when the industries were rationalised and prepared for
sale. Evidence of this effectwas found in British Airways, British Airports
Authority, British Steel (Boussoﬁane, Martin & Parker, 1997) and in
State-owned Canadian enterprises (Bozec & Dia, 2003).
Although some studies have found evidence of positive impacts,
there are others which could not ﬁnd clear evidence of any discernible
impact of privatisation on efﬁciency. Examples come from the telecom-
munications industry (Kang, 2009), the container port industry
11C.A.F. Amado et al. / Journal of Business Research 73 (2017) 9–19(Cullinane, Ji &Wang, 2005), the transport industry (Parker, 1999), and
the manufacturing sector (Abokaresh & Kamaruddin, 2011).
Another note of caution regarding the impact of privatisation comes
from the telecommunications, energy and transport industries in Spain.
In trying to make sense of the results obtained in the Spanish context,
Bachiller (2009, p. 303) emphasises that “the question is not the dichot-
omy of public versus private provider but, rather, the economic condi-
tions under which services are delivered”. In this respect, as suggested
by Parker (1993), the existence of competition is considered a requisite
for the achievement of improvements in production efﬁciency.
Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) proposed a dynamic model to explain
the variation in the impact of privatisation on the performance of
ﬁrms. According to this model, when certain conditions are met,
privatisation triggers changes in goals, incentives and control mecha-
nisms, which lead to changes in the strategy, structure and culture of
the ﬁrm, resulting in improved performance. According to Cuervo and
Villalonga (2000), a crucial condition for privatisation to lead to im-
provements in performance is the replacement of top management.
The proposed model suggests that privatisation, when accompanied
by top management replacement, prompts a ﬁrm to develop more
innovative strategies and to undertake structural changes, due to the
new capabilities, resources and mechanisms that are introduced in the
ﬁrm. These authors also emphasise the importance of the existence of
market competition in order to observe improvements in performance
after privatisation.
We argue that access to new resources and capabilities and the pur-
suit of more innovative business strategies (as proposed by Cuervo &
Villalonga, 2000) may lead to technological progress (the best practice
frontier shifts to superior levels of performance) and consequently to
improvements in total factor productivity. In fact, there is some empir-
ical evidence suggesting that privatisation leads to changes in total fac-
tor productivity (please, refer to Section 2 of Table S1).
Successful stories of a positive impact of privatisation on productiv-
ity have been reported from British Gas (Price &Weyman-Jones, 1996),
several Korean banks (Gilbert &Wilson, 1998), TaiwanMotor Transport
Company (Cho & Fan, 2007) and from a sample of telecommunication
companies across the world (Ariff, Cabanda & Sathye, 2009). Parker
andWu (1998) found evidence of anticipation effects in the productiv-
ity of the British Steel Corporation.
On the contrary, Fethi, Shaban and Weyman-Jones (2011) provided
evidence that privatisation is not sufﬁcient to improve productivity in
the banking sector. In fact, these authors offered evidence of a negative
impact of privatisation on the productivity of Egyptian banks, which
was explained by a regress of the best practice frontier.
Considering the theoretical arguments discussed previously and
the lack of evidence regarding the impact of privatisation in the accom-
modation industry, this research aims to test the following research
hypotheses:
H1. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by topmanagement replacement, leads to tech-
nological progress;
H2. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in production efﬁciency;
H3. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in total factor productivity.2.2. Impact of privatisation on labour productivity, proﬁtability and capac-
ity utilisation
In order to contribute to the opening of the black box regarding the
impact of privatisation on performance in the accommodation sector,we consider that it is important to analyse the effect of privatisation
on speciﬁc performance indicators. This will allow us to better under-
stand the mechanisms through which performance may alter after
privatisation.
Previous studies employing individual performance indicators have
analysed the impact of privatisation on labour productivity and proﬁt-
ability in different sectors, having concluded, almost unanimously,
that privatisation improves these indicators (please refer to the review
by Megginson & Netter, 2001). However, it is important to emphasise
that previous studies have also concluded that the improvements ob-
served in labour productivity and proﬁtability usually come at the ex-
pense of job loss (see, for example, La Porta & López-de-Silanes, 1999)
and/or at the expense of higher prices to ﬁnal consumers (see, for exam-
ple, Newberry & Pollitt, 1997), with their associated social costs.
Following the model proposed by Cuervo and Villalonga (2000), in
addition to improvements in labour productivity and proﬁtability,
after privatisation, one would also expect to see improvements in out-
put related indicators, due to control systems that are more market
based. In the accommodation industry, revenue indicators and occupan-
cy rates are important output indicators (Sigala, 2004; Huang, Mesak,
Hsu & Qu, 2012).
Based on these theoretical arguments, in order to better understand
the effects of privatisation in the accommodation industry, we also aim
to test the following three additional hypotheses:
H4. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in labour productivity;
H5. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in proﬁtability;
H6. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in capacity utilisation.
Having stated the hypotheses that we want to test in this study, we
will now discuss the context that was chosen to test them.3. Background
Travel and tourism is oneof themain sectors of the Portuguese Econ-
omy,with a total contribution of 29.2 billion euros in 2015, representing
16.4% of the Gross Domestic Product (The Authority on World Travel
and Tourism, 2016). The accommodation industry in Portugal is an im-
portant part of the Travel and Tourism sector and, in 2015, this industry
generated 2.4 billion euros in revenue (Instituto Nacional de Estatística,
2016).
Pousadas de Portugal is a chain of heritage hotels created by the State
in 1942 which, in November 2016, had 35 units. Despite representing a
relatively small proportion of the accommodation industry in Portugal,
this chain of hotels plays a central role in Portuguese society, due to its
historic and cultural value, and its protection is considered of para-
mount importance.
This chain of hotels belongs to a holding company named Enatur,
which had 49% of its capital privatised in 2003. Following this initiative,
since September 1st 2003, the chain has been managed by a multina-
tional company (GPP). GPP belongs to the largest group operating in
the Portuguese accommodation industry, namely Pestana Group. The
hotels in the chain are equivalent to 4 and 5 star hotels and compete
with other Portuguese hotels and with some long established and well
known groups such as Ritz, Savoy, Sheraton, Holiday Inn and Marriott.
The privatisation of Enaturwasmotivated by its continuous and sig-
niﬁcant losses. The performance of this company has been previously
analysed in Barros and Alves (2004), Barros and Mascarenhas (2005),
and Barros (2005a, 2005b). These studies reported signiﬁcant levels of
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performance. In one of these studies (Barros & Alves, 2004),
privatisation had already been suggested as one of the solutions.
4. Methods
In order to evaluate the impact of the privatisation of Enatur on total
factor productivity and its components, we used the non-parametric
technique known as Data Envelopment Analysis, developed by
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). This technique uses a production
metaphor. It considers that each Decision Making Unit (DMU) is en-
gaged in a transformation process, where by using some inputs (re-
sources) it is trying to produce some outputs (goods or services). DEA
uses all the data available to construct a best practice empirical frontier,
to which each inefﬁcient DMU is compared. The best practice frontier is
determined by the convex combination of the observations that achieve
the highest weighted average of outputs to the weighted average of in-
puts. The efﬁciency of a ﬁrm in a speciﬁc period is, in turn, calculated by
measuring the distance the ﬁrm is from the closest facet of the best
practice frontier of that period. When measuring production efﬁciency
with DEA one can assume an input orientation or an output orientation.
With an input orientation, production efﬁciency is a measure of the
distance between the current level of input usage and the minimum
level of input that could be used to produce the current level of outputs
(as given by the best practice frontier). When an output orientation is
used, production efﬁciency is calculated from the distance between
the current level of output production and themaximum level of output
production that is feasible considering the level of resource usage and
given the current technology.
Further to the speciﬁcation of the model orientation, one must also
specify a return to scale assumption in order to estimate the best
practice frontier. If an increase in the inputs is expected to lead to a
proportional increase in the outputs, a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS)
assumption is appropriate, as proposed by Charnes, Cooper and
Rhodes (1978). On the contrary, if a variation in the inputs is not expect-
ed to lead to proportional increases in the outputs, then a Variable
Returns to Scale (VRS) assumption is appropriate, as proposed by
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). When a VRS assumption is used,
one may also run a model with the CRS assumption in order to study
the level of scale inefﬁciency present in the sample. Scale efﬁciency is
calculated by dividing the scores obtained from the model with the
CRS assumption by the scores obtainedwith themodelwith the VRS as-
sumption. By using a VRS assumption, one estimates a measure of pure
technical efﬁciency which is only inﬂuenced by the effect of managerial
efﬁciency. When a CRS assumption is used one calculates a measure of
technical efﬁciency, which combines the effects ofmanagerial efﬁciency
with the effects of scale efﬁciency.
Appendix A presents the mathematical formulation of the DEA
models used to calculate the relative efﬁciency of each DMU, with a
CRS assumption and an output orientation.
DEA can also be used to assess productivity changes over
time through the calculation of the Malmquist Productivity Index
(MPI) and its components (Caves, Christensen & Diewert, 1982; Färe,
Grosskopf, Lindgren & Roos, 1994; Malmquist, 1953). The MPI is “an
index representing Total Factor Productivity growth of a DMU, in that
it reﬂects progress or regress in efﬁciency alongwith progress or regress
of the frontier technology over time under themultiple inputs andmul-
tiple outputs framework” (Tone, 2004, p. 203).
In order to better understandhow theMPImeasures changes in total
factor productivity, it is important to explain how it is calculated. The
MPI is calculated by multiplying two indices: the ‘frontier shift index’
(F) and the ‘catch-up effect index’ (C).
The ‘frontier shift index’ captures the change in the efﬁcient frontier
from one period to another. This index is also known as technological
change, considering that a shift in the frontier allowing a higher level
of performance is usually the result of technological progress or someother type of innovation. In order to calculate the ‘frontier shift index’
it is necessary to evaluate the observations of ﬁrms operating in one pe-
riodwith regards to the frontier of the other period. If this index is equal
to one for a particular ﬁrm, itmeans that the best practice frontier that is
closest to the observation for this ﬁrm has not shifted. Alternatively, if
this index is superior (inferior) to one, it means that the best practice
frontier that is closest to the observation for the ﬁrm under analysis
has shifted towards higher (lower) levels of performance.
The ‘catch-up index’ is measured by comparing the efﬁciency rate
observed for a ﬁrm in one period with the efﬁciency rate of that ﬁrm
in the preceding period. If this index is equal to one, it means that the
ﬁrm is at the same distance to the best practice frontier. If it is superior
(inferior) to one, it means that the efﬁciency rate of the ﬁrm increased
(decreased) from one period to the other.
The calculation of the MPI and of its two components (F and C) for
the period before privatisation and for the period after privatisation
will allow us to test our ﬁrst group of hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3).
The mathematical formulation used to calculate the MPI index and
each of its two components is presented in Appendix B.
Although DEA can provide signiﬁcant insights into the impact of
privatisation on performance, Thanassoulis, Boussoﬁane and Dyson
(1996) suggest that ratio analysis can complement the information ob-
tained with DEA, as it can identify the speciﬁc areas of performance that
require closer attention. In this respect, following the theory regarding
the most important indicators in the accommodation context (see, for
example, Huang, Ho & Chio, 2014; Min, Min & Joo, 2008; Peng, Huang
& Wu, 2013), and constrained by data availability, six performance ra-
tios were calculated, as described below:
1) Rev per worker = Total revenue/Full Time Equivalent workers;
2) Rev to costs = Total revenue/Labour and operational costs;
3) Room rev to costs = Room related revenue andmiscellaneous reve-
nue/Labour and operational costs;
4) F&B rev to costs= Food & beverage revenue/Labour and operational
costs;
5) RevPar = Room related revenue andmiscellaneous revenue/Rooms
available;
6) Occupancy rate = Rooms occupied/Rooms available.
These six ratios cover three different areas of performance: ratio 1
relates to labour productivity, ratios 2, 3, 4 and 5 relate to proﬁtability
and ratio 6 relates to capacity utilisation, allowing us to test the second
group of hypotheses (H4, H5 and H6).
In order to examine whether a signiﬁcant difference exists between
the performance in the period before privatisation and the performance
in the period after privatisation, we use Wilcoxon signed rank tests, as
proposed byWilcoxon (1945). Appendix C provides a detailed descrip-
tion of the steps involved in carrying out this statistical test in the con-
text under study.
The reasoning behind the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is relatively
simple. In our study, the null hypothesis is that the median difference
between the performance observed before privatisation and after
privatisation is equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is true, we expect
the distribution of differences in performance to be approximately
symmetrical around the null value; that is, whilst some ﬁrms may
have improved their performance, others would have deteriorated.
Furthermore, we would not expect the ﬁrms that have improved (or
deteriorated) their performance to appear systematically at higher or
lower ranks. In this respect, the sum of the ranks should be approxi-
mately equal, without extreme values in one of the sums. If an extreme
value is observed in one of the sums, it means that there is a high
probability that the null hypothesis of no performance differences is
rejected.
The advantage of using this non-parametric statistic to test for differ-
ences in the performance results over the use of the parametric statisti-
cal tests proposed by Banker and Natarajan (2004) is that it requires
fewer assumptions about the distribution of inefﬁciency and can be
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samples can the distributional assumptions imposed for the true inefﬁ-
ciency variable be carried over to the empirical distribution of the DEA
estimator of inefﬁciency in order to perform parametric statistical tests.
5. Studying the impact of partial privatisation on the performance of
Pousadas de Portugal
5.1. The DEA model used
As discussed by Pedraja-Chaparro, Salinas-Jiménez and Smith
(1999), the choice of appropriate inputs and outputs is a fundamental
step in DEA given that the efﬁciency scores tend to be sensitive to this
choice.
Having in mind the type of variables used in previous DEA studies
(see, for example, Yu & Lee, 2009; Assaf & Josiassen, 2015), following
the advice provided in Dyson, Allen, Camanho, Podinovski, Sarrico and
Shale (2001), and constrained bydata availability for the period studied,
we developed the DEAmodel presented in Fig. 1, which has four inputs
and two outputs.
The variables included in the model capture the essential elements
of hotel operations, both in terms of resources used (capital and labour)
and services delivered.
The ﬁrst input represents a proxy for capital, as used in previous
studies (see, for example, Barros 2005a, Chen 2013). Another proxy
for capital that would have been relevant to include is the book value
of property. However, we could not access data for this input for the
whole period analysed. The second input captures the total number of
nights that were available for sale during the years under analyses.
This input is a function of the number of rooms available in the hotel,
being a determinant for revenue generation. The third input represents
the Full Time Equivalent (FTE) workers which accounts for the labour
resources of the hotels. The fourth input represents the labour and oper-
ational costs, which account for the large majority of costs incurred by
these hotels. External costs could also have been incorporated in the
analysis, but we could only access reliable data for this variable for the
period of 2006–10. For this period, this type of costs represented only
3% of the total costs, and their inclusionwould not have a signiﬁcant im-
pact in the aggregate results obtained for the chain in these ﬁve years.
The two outputs represent the total sales of each hotel, separated by
type. We have decided to separate the sales into two groups: those re-
lated with rooms and other types of sales (internet, souvenirs, etc.)
and those related with food and beverages. This decomposition follows
the decompositionmadeby the accountingdepartment of the chain and
allows for trade-offs between these two activity areas.
All the monetary variables were included at 2001 constant prices in
order to allow a comparison between the different years.
A DEA model with an output-orientation was used, because it was
considered that hotels should aim to maximise revenue levels based
on their current capital and labour structure. With regards to returns
to scale, we used a CRS assumption. This was considered appropriate
as, in a separate analysis, we concluded that scale efﬁciency remained
relatively stable during this period (no signiﬁcant change in the levelFig. 1. DEA Model used to evaluate theof scale efﬁciency was identiﬁed by Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests). Fur-
thermore, as discussed in the DEA literature (see, for example,
Sueyoshi & Sekitani, 2009), only the model proposed by Charnes,
Cooper and Rhodes (1978), with a CRS assumption, can satisfy the prop-
erty of frontier shift measurability. In this respect, considering that one
of our main objectives is to identify potential shifts in the best practice
frontier, we chose to use a DEA model with a CRS assumption.
6. Data and results
In order to test the research hypotheses formulated, we used data
provided by GPP for the period of 2001 to 2010 for a sample of 26 hotels
belonging to the Pousadas de Portugal chain. This is a balanced panel of
data with 260 observations corresponding to the 26 hotels that operat-
ed in the 10 year period analysed (two years prior to privatisation,
privatisation year and seven years after privatisation). Despite efforts
to obtain data regarding more years prior to privatisation, no reliable
data could be obtained for the years prior to 2001.
Table 1 presents the yearly descriptive statistics of data for the 26
hotels compared between 2001 and 2010. All monetary values are pre-
sented in euros and relate to 2001 constant prices, in order to allow
comparisons of the pre-privatisation period with the post-privatisation
period.
From Table 1 it is possible to verify that the total area of the hotels
did not change during the ten year period analysed. However, when
we look at the number of FTE workers, we can conﬁrm that the number
ofworkers decreased signiﬁcantly after privatisation. Speciﬁcally,whilst
in 2002, the average number of FTE workers was approximately 31, in
2010 this number had decreased to 21. Furthermore, the minimum
and maximum FTE workers also show a signiﬁcant decrease, from a
minimum of 20 and a maximum of 53 in 2002, to a minimum of 4 and
a maximum of 35 in 2010.
When we analyse the descriptive statistics of cost data, we observe
an increase in labour and operational costs in the privatisation year,
followed by a regular decrease in the years after privatisation. With
regards to revenue,we observe a general tendency for both types of rev-
enue to decrease during the ten year period studied.
Having discussed the summary statistics of our data, we will now
present and discuss the results obtained in the analysis carried out to
test each of the six hypotheses formulated. In this presentation and dis-
cussionwe focus on change rather than absolute performance values, as
the latter aremore prone to have been inﬂuenced by exogenous factors.
6.1. Changes in total factor productivity (testing H1, H2 and H3)
In order to get a full picture regarding the evolution of productivity
during the ten year period studied, we have calculated the cumulative
MPI for the chain, using 2001 as the base year. Fig. 2 presents the evolu-
tion of the geometric mean of the cumulative MPI for the chain and of
each of its two components. Consistent with previous studies (see, for
example, Fethi, Shaban & Weyman-Jones, 2011), the geometric mean
is used as this is the most suitable measure when we want to average
indices.level of productivity of the hotels.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the data for the 26 hotels between 2001 and 2010.
Variables 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
X1 — Area
Mean 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12 4054.12
St Dev 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61 2291.61
Min 973 973 973 973 973 973 973 973 973 973
Max 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099
Range 7126 7126 7126 7126 7126 7126 7126 7126 7126 7126
X2 — Room nights available
Mean 10,335.58 10,325.85 10,146.19 10,356.23 10,577.27 10,494.88 10,585.92 10,645.92 10,023.42 10,414.62
St Dev 3733.59 3658.16 3452.23 3894.06 4047.5 4181.16 4223.99 4264.89 4116.12 4390.92
Min 3285 3285 3033 3261 3285 3285 3276 3289 3285 3174
Max 18,615 17,541 17,520 18,666 18,615 18,615 18,615 18,666 18,615 18,615
Range 15,330 14,256 14,487 15,405 15,330 15,330 15,339 15,377 15,330 15,441
X3 — FTE workers
Mean 30.97 31.25 31.14 28.35 26.81 25.24 24.27 23.52 22.12 20.77
St Dev 8.79 9 8.76 8.26 8.02 8.19 7.77 7.28 6.9 7.38
Min 18.08 19.83 19.25 16.33 16.25 14.67 13.92 13.92 12 4
Max 52.25 52.58 52.25 52.42 51.17 49.58 44.58 44.42 41 35
Range 34.17 32.75 33 36.09 34.92 34.91 30.67 30.5 29 31
X4 — Labour & operational costs
Mean 781,197.96 759,590.19 805,512.77 785,760.08 763,976.65 739,858.31 718,902.04 699,487.42 622,924.73 594,095.08
St Dev 282,675.12 256,186.09 251,352.06 262,575.41 260,977.4 249,498.16 250,624.47 236,103.6 209,718.06 209,192.61
Min 422,817 449,503 469,214 443,017 437,807 422,935 373,600 386,996 331,527 258,614
Max 1,498,324 1,306,547 1,310,028 1,510,078 1,436,155 1,395,181 1,319,491 1,234,345 1,107,352 1,021,366
Range 1,075,507 857,044 840,814 1,067,061 998,348 972,246 945,891 847,349 775,825 762,752
Y1 — Room & other type of revenue
Mean 513,291.5 498,654.35 421,730.54 435,077.96 421,759.08 447,530.04 453,237.04 405,818.62 359,843.88 344,644.62
St Dev 228,223.98 221,021.21 176,086.79 187,368.71 190,267.9 206,854.04 219,732.26 192,551.24 181,578.23 170,777.05
Min 228,052 240,136 206,836 222,188 179,718 183,427 192,580 189,464 134,888 138,827
Max 1,085,517 1,067,278 905,345 845,341 845,488 905,722 932,674 824,408 770,230 694,893
Range 857,465 827,142 698,509 623,153 665,770 722,295 740,094 634,944 635,342 556,066
Y2 — F&B revenue
Mean 484,253.08 473,535.35 425,005.19 418,425.27 431,220.38 432,225.15 431,312.73 393,430.46 334,021.19 292,424.27
St Dev 237,073.95 195,361.21 150,590.59 155,100.36 158,062.51 164,607.3 187,218.43 179,150.75 150,241.91 145,444.11
Min 209,678 229,244 199,228 194,494 215,185 222,784 205,252 179,954 140,653 47,743
Max 1,289,593 981,463 717,107 900,012 860,145 896,581 1,005,529 904,903 749,680 709,487
Range 1,079,915 752,219 517,879 705,518 644,960 673,797 800,277 724,949 609,027 661,744
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different periods (pre-privatisation period: 2001–2002; privatisation
year: 2003; post-privatisation period before the onset of the interna-
tional crisis: 2004–2007 and economic crisis period: 2008–2010).
The pattern of evolution observed in each of the four periods identi-
ﬁed suggests that privatisation and the onset of the economic crisis af-
fected signiﬁcantly the level of productivity of this chain. Another
interesting aspect to notice from Fig. 2 is that, in the four periods, de-
spite some alterations in the level of efﬁciency, the general pattern of
evolution in productivity is mainly explained by frontier shifts.
Speciﬁcally, we observe that in the pre-privatisation period only
small changes took place in the level of productivity (around 1%Fig. 2. Evolution of cumulative MPI for Enatur chain (2001 as base year).regress from 2001 to 2002). Contrasting heavily with the situation
before privatisation, in the privatisation year we observe a strong
detriment in productivity (MPI2001–2003 = 0.88). This 12% regress
in productivity can be explained by a strong technological regress
(F2001–2003 = 0.82), which means that the efﬁcient hotels suffered
signiﬁcantly and operated in 2003 at a level of performance that
was, on average, 18% worse than that observed in 2001. One can
also notice that the average level of efﬁciency in 2003 was 7% higher
than in 2001. However, this improvement needs to be interpreted
with caution as this efﬁciency is in relation to a best practice frontier
that is considerably inferior.
From 2003 onwards, we observe improvements in productivity
(mainly explained by frontier shifts). Nevertheless, despite these im-
provements, it is only in 2006 and 2007 that the best practice frontier
is at a similar level of performance to that observed in 2001. Considering
that the inefﬁcient hotels were not always able to catch up with the
shifts of the best practice frontier, in aggregate terms, in 2007, the
level of productivity was still 1% below the level observed in 2001.
As would be expected, due to the onset of the economic crisis, after
2007 we observe a decline in the best practice frontier of this chain
and a consequent decline in productivity (MPI decreased 13% from
2007 to 2010).
Considering the strong regress observed in the best practice frontier
in the privatisation year, care needs to be taken in analysing the impact
of privatisation on performance. A common methodology used in the
literature to analyse the impacts of privatisation with longitudinal
data (see, for example, Ariff, Cabanda & Sathye, 2009) is to compare
the average rates of change in performance from the pre-privatisation
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ison allows us to test our ﬁrst group of hypotheses:
H1. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by topmanagement replacement, leads to tech-
nological progress;
H2. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in production efﬁciency;
H3. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in total factor productivity.
In this respect, in order to test H1, H2 and H3, we compare the per-
formance of the hotels in the period before privatisation with the per-
formance in the period after privatisation. More speciﬁcally, we
contrast the rates of change in three separate periods. The ﬁrst period
is the pre-privatisation period: 2001 to 2002; the second period is the
post-privatisation period before the onset of the international crisis:
2004–2007 (using the geometric mean of indices from 2004 to 2005;
2005–2006 and 2006–2007) and the third period is the economic crisis
period: 2007–2010 (using the geometric means of indices from 2007
to 2008; 2008–2009 and 2009–2010). The changes around the
privatisation year (from 2002 to 2003 and from 2003 to 2004) were
not included in this comparison given that 2003 was a transformation
year, with the inﬂuence of both public and private management
(privatisation took place in September 2003). Fig. 3 contrasts the geo-
metric mean values for the MPI and its components for these three
periods.
When we contrast the three periods, we conclude that the strongest
difference observed was in terms of frontier shift. Whilst in the period
before privatisation, we could only observe an average shift in the best
practice frontier of 1%, in the period after privatisation this average
rate of change was 5%. Using theWilcoxon signed rank tests, we can re-
ject the null hypothesis (for H1) of a nullmediandifference between the
value of technological change in the period before privatisation and in
the period after privatisation (two-sided p-value = 0.000). In this re-
spect, in the period after privatisation, before the onset of the economic
crisis, we observe a higher rate of technological change than that ob-
served before privatisation (the best practice frontier shifted towards
higher levels of performance).
Inefﬁcient hotels appear to have caught up with the best practice
frontier, that is, the change in the average efﬁciency of the hotels
being slightly higher in the post-privatisation period than in the pre-
privatisation period (although the difference in the efﬁciency change
of the twoperiods is b1%). Using theWilcoxon signed rank testswe can-
not reject the null hypothesis (for H2) of a null median difference be-
tween the catch-up effect of the period before privatisation and theFig. 3. Productivity changes before and after privatisation.catch-up effect of the period after privatisation (two-sided p-value =
0.798). In this respect, our data does not support the hypothesis that
production efﬁciency improves after the partial privatisation of hotels.
The combined result of these two effects is that, on average, produc-
tivity improved at a higher rate in the post-privatisation period when
compared with the pre-privatisation period (the rate of improvement
in productivity is 5% higher in the post-privatisation period). Using the
Wilcoxon signed rank test, we can reject the null hypothesis (for H3)
of a null median difference between the MPI before privatisation and
the MPI after privatisation (two-sided p-value = 0.028).
From Fig. 3, we can also conﬁrmwhat would be expected in terms of
the evolution of productivity after the start of the economic crisis. In this
period we observe a regress in the best practice frontier. The Wilcoxon
signed rank test identiﬁes a signiﬁcant change in the value of F (two-
sided p-value=0.000). Efﬁciency change after the onset of the econom-
ic crisis remains relatively stable when comparedwith the previous pe-
riod (no signiﬁcant change was identiﬁed with the Wilcoxon signed
rank test, two sided p-value = 0.757). The regress in the best practice
frontier observed after the onset of the economic crisis results in a
mean annual deterioration in the level of productivity of around 5%.
The Wilcoxon signed rank test allows us to reject the null hypothesis
of a null median difference between the value of the MPI for the period
after privatisation and the MPI for the period after the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis (two-sided p-value = 0.000).
Regarding the impact of partial privatisation on total factor produc-
tivity of hotels, our data suggest that signiﬁcant improvements in pro-
ductivity change may be expected due to technological progress. On
the contrary, our data suggest that no signiﬁcant improvements in efﬁ-
ciency change should be expected. However, care should be taken in
analysing the full impact of privatisation becausewhen a signiﬁcant dis-
ruption is observed during the privatisation year, leading to a negative
frontier shift, the level of accumulated productivity may take several
years to recover.
6.2. Changes in individual performance ratios (testing H4, H5 and H6)
In order to analyse the separate effects of partial privatisation on la-
bour productivity, proﬁtability and occupancy rate, the following per-
formance ratios were calculated:
1) Rev per worker = Total revenue/FTE workers;
2) Rev to costs = Total revenue/Labour and operational costs;
3) Room rev to costs = Room related revenue andmiscellaneous reve-
nue/Labour and operational costs;
4) F&B rev to costs= Food & beverage revenue/Labour and operational
costs;
5) RevPar = Room related revenue andmiscellaneous revenue/Rooms
available;
6) Occupancy rate = Rooms occupied/Rooms available.
The values observed for these performance ratios in the four periods
(pre-privatisation; privatisation year; post-privatisation; economic cri-
sis) were compared. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the
six performance ratios regarding the four different periods.
An analysis of the information presented in Table 2 provides inter-
esting insights. From one period to the other, we observe that whilst
the chain shows signs of improvement in some ratios, it shows signs
of deterioration in others.
In order to make sense of this performance information, we analyse
each group of the performance ratios in turn.When we look at the evo-
lution of labour productivity (revenue per worker), we can see that this
ratio deteriorates strongly in the privatisation year, improves strongly in
the period after privatisation (to a level that is superior to that observed
prior to privatisation), anddeteriorates slightly during the economic cri-
sis period.
A different pattern of behaviour is observed in the ratios relatedwith
proﬁtability. The indicator of revenue that was most strongly affected
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the performance ratios in different periods.
Performance ratios N Pre-privatisation period Privatisation year Post-privatisation period Economic crisis period
Mean
(2001–2002)
Std. Deviation
(2001–2002)
Mean
(2003)
Std. Deviation
(2003)
Mean
(2004–2007)
Std. Deviation
(2004–2007)
Mean
(2008–2010)
Std. Deviation
(2008–2010)
Rev per worker (in euros) 26 30,885.6 5450.4 26,858.6 4567.9 32,857.0 6190.9 31,582.9 6298.1
Rev to costs 26 1.3 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.1 1.1 0.2
Room rev to costs 26 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.1
F&B rev to costs 26 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1
RevPar (in euros) 26 50.6 19.5 43.5 17.9 43.7 18.7 37.0 15.8
Occupancy rate 26 54.8% 10.7% 50.5% 9.8% 54.5% 9.8% 50.1% 8.1%
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the economic crisis was RevPar. This is a ratio that indicates the average
level of revenue per available room and it has reduced 27% from the pre-
privatisation period to the economic crisis period. The average occupan-
cy rate remains almost constant from the pre-privatisation period to the
post-privatisation period, showing some deterioration after the onset of
the economic crisis.
Considering that the objective of this paper is to analyse the impact
of privatisation, in order to test the second group of hypotheses (H4, H5
and H6), we will now focus our analysis on contrasting the period be-
fore privatisation (2001−2002) with that after privatisation (2004–
2007) and will analyse the statistical signiﬁcance of the changes ob-
served by using theWilcoxon SignedRank tests. As previously discussed
the three hypotheses that were formulated regarding changes in the
performance ratios are:
H4. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in labour productivity;
H5. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in proﬁtability;
H6. Partial privatisation of a chain of hotels operating in a competitive
market, if accompanied by top management replacement, leads to im-
provements in capacity utilisation.
Table 3 provides the results for the Wilcoxon signed rank tests for
the differences in the performance ratios between these two periods.
The information presented in Table 3 shows that when we compare
the post-privatisation period with the pre-privatisation period in terms
of the revenue per worker, we observe that the difference is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. Thismeans thatwe reject the null
hypothesis (for H4). We can also verify that the revenue per worker is
much higher in the period after privatisation than in the period before
privatisation (please refer to Table 2). With regard to proﬁtability, the
conclusion is different. Whilst we can reject the null hypothesis (for
H5) regarding no proﬁtability change, we can also verify that most of
the ratios related to proﬁtability show a statistically signiﬁcant reduc-
tion after partial privatisation (please refer to Table 2). Speciﬁcally, the
ratio of total revenue to costs decreased by 9.6%. The type of revenue
that was most affected was room related revenue, which decreased byTable 3
Wilcoxon signed rank tests for the differences in performance ratios from the period before pr
Rev per worker (after) —
Rev. per worker (before)
Rev to costs (after) —
Rev. to costs (before)
Room rev to co
Room rev to co
Z −2.603a −4.153b −4.102b
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.009⁎ 0.000⁎ 0.000⁎
a Based on negative ranks.
b Based on positive ranks.
⁎ Means statistical signiﬁcance at or below the 1% signiﬁcance level.12.2%. Furthermore, RevPar also shows a statistically signiﬁcant reduc-
tion of 13.6%. With H6, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
change in capacity utilisation after partial privatisation, because the oc-
cupancy rate remains almost constant, showing a reduction of b1%,
which is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Our data regarding a chain of heritage hotels operating in Portugal,
for the six performance ratios analysed, suggests that after partial
privatisation one should not expect a signiﬁcant improvement in all
performance ratios. Whilst we found evidence that average revenue
per worker increased signiﬁcantly from the period before privatisation
to the period after privatisation, most of the proﬁtability ratios deterio-
rated signiﬁcantly after partial privatisation of the chain. Furthermore,
our data did not identify a signiﬁcant change in terms of the occupancy
rate following partial privatisation.
7. Discussion and conclusions
Despite some notes of caution regarding the necessary conditions
that need to be observed and regarding the potential social losses
involved, the dominant theoretical arguments and a large number of
empirical studies suggest that privatisation leads to improved perfor-
mance. However, most of the previous empirical studies dedicated to
this issue have focused on the impact of privatisation on production ef-
ﬁciency, ignoring the potential effects that privatisation may have on
the best practice frontier and on total factor productivity.
In this study,we tested six hypotheses relatedwith the impact of the
partial privatisation of a chain of hotels. These hypotheses relate, on one
side, with the impact of privatisation on total factor productivity, and,
on the other side, with the impact of privatisation on labour productiv-
ity, proﬁtability and occupancy rate.
Despite being a partial privatisation (51% of the capital remained in
the hands of the State), from 2003 onwards, 49% of the capital and the
responsibility for topmanagement of this chainwas transferred to a pri-
vate group with extensive experience in the accommodation industry.
According to the model developed by Cuervo and Villalonga (2000),
this change in top management, and the associated access to new capa-
bilities and resources, should have triggered changes in the strategy,
structure and culture of the hotels, leading to improved performance.
Furthermore, considering that previous studies have suggested that
market competition is a requisite for performance improvement after
privatisation (Parker, 1993; Cuervo & villalonga, 2000), the strongivatisation to the period after privatisation.
sts (after) —
sts (before)
F&B rev to costs (after) —
F&B rev to costs (before)
RevPar (after) —
RevPar before)
Occupancy rate (after) —
Occupancy rate (before)
−3.162b −4.051b −0.749b
0.002⁎ 0.000⁎ 0.454
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in Portugal makes this context an ideal setting to study the impact of
privatisation.
Our results show that, on average, hotels were approximately 1%
more efﬁcient in the period after privatisation than theywere in the pe-
riod before privatisation, although this change is not statistically signif-
icant. Furthermore, we conclude that the rate of technological change
was signiﬁcantly higher in the post-privatisation period than in the
pre-privatisation period (difference of 4%). This signiﬁcant frontier
shift may be the result of the adoption of more advanced technology
(for example, more sophisticated information systems), more advanced
processes or better control mechanisms (as suggested by Cuervo &
Villalonga, 2000), by the hotels operating at the best practice frontier.
Alternatively, these shifts may simply reveal a gradual resolution of
the internal disruption caused by privatisation.
However, despite being statistically signiﬁcant, this technological
progress in the post-privatisation periodwas not enough to compensate
for the strong negative effects that resulted from the internal disruption
that affected this chain in the privatisation year. In 2007, the best perfor-
mance year of the post-privatisation period analysed, just before the
onset of the economic crisis, the level of productivity in this chain was
still 1% below the level observed in 2001 (two years before
privatisation). Strong detrimental effects on productivity around the
privatisation year have also been identiﬁed in privatisation studies
analysing data from other countries (see, for example, Brown, Earle &
Telegdy, 2006). These authors justify these negative effects on produc-
tivity with the internal disruptions caused by privatisation.
Our analysis of the performance ratios of this chain reveals that the
effect of privatisation on performance varies depending on the indicator
used. The indicators that most suffered after privatisation are those re-
lated to revenue (RevPar decreased by 13.6%) and proﬁtability (the
ratio of total revenue to costs decreased by 9.6%) and the only perfor-
mance ratio that improved after privatisation was labour productivity
(the ratio of revenue per worker increased by 6.4%). Meggison and
Netter (2001) also found some evidence regarding the fact that
privatisation effects differ depending on the performance indicators
used. Furthermore, consistent with the results of other studies (for ex-
ample, La Porta & Lopéz-de-Silanes, 1999), we also found evidence of
job losses after privatisation (an average of 16% reduction).
These results have relevance for researchers and policy makers as
they suggest that caution is needed in a number of areaswhen analysing
the effects of privatisation.
Firstly, our ﬁndings are relevant for researchers as they show that it
is not sufﬁcient to analyse the effects of privatisation on production ef-
ﬁciency, as signiﬁcant frontier shifts may occur. In this respect, we sug-
gest that an analysis of the effects of privatisation on total factor
productivity and on its components should be undertaken. Further-
more, our results conﬁrm that it is important to complement the mea-
surement of productivity with an analysis regarding the areas of
performance mostly affected by privatisation in order to study the sep-
arate effects of privatisation.
Secondly, our results are also signiﬁcant for policy makers, as
they shed some doubts regarding the expected positive impact of
privatisation on the performance of enterprises. Our results suggest
that Governments should carefully consider their decisions regarding
the privatisation of enterprises, as the intended impact on performance
may not be fully realised. Our results show that, on average, four years
after partial privatisation, accompanied by the replacement of top man-
agement, heritage hotels operating in Portugal had not yet been able to
fully recover from the strong regress in productivity observed during
the privatisation year.
8. Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research
Whilst the results obtained enhance our knowledge on the impact of
privatisation on theperformance of organisations, it is important to bearinmind that they should be interpretedwith caution for threemain rea-
sons: Firstly, this study analyses the effects of a partial privatisation pro-
gramme (only 49% of the capital was privatised). Despite the top
management team being replaced, the fact that the State kept 51% of
the capital of the chain may have inﬂuenced the results. Secondly, the
fact that our study focuses on a sample taken from one industry and
one company limits the generalizability of the results regarding the
impact of privatisation. Thirdly, this study suffers from some limitations
related with the data available for analysis: on one side, it would have
been useful to include data relating to a longer period before
privatisation and it would also have been useful to include data regard-
ing other variables (book value of properties, external costs and level of
quality of the services provided); on the other side, the relatively small
size of the sample used (26 hotels) inhibits more sophisticated analysis
regarding the causes behind the results, such as a bootstrapped regres-
sion analysis as proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).
Future studies should further investigate the impact of privatisation in
this sector and in other sectors consideringmultiple performance dimen-
sions (total factor productivity, quality and equity, if relevant) in order to
better understand its effects, the stakeholders affected and the conditions
under which privatisation may be associated with certain effects.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.12.001.
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Appendix A. An introduction to data envelopment analysis
Let us consider a general case characterised by the existence of nDe-
cision Making Units (DMUj, j = 1,…, n) to be compared, which usem
inputs (xi, i = 1, …, m) to produce s outputs (yr, r = 1, …, s). The
input weight or multiplier associated with input i is vi and the output
weight or multiplier associated with output r is ur. The objective of
the Data Envelopment Analysis mathematical model (in its multiplier
version) is to ﬁnd the optimal weights for each input and output, in
order to maximise the efﬁciency score of the DMU under assessment.
The output-oriented version of the mathematical model, in its mul-
tiplier version and in linear form, which should be used to calculate
the Technical Efﬁciency of DMU0 is:
Min ∑mi¼1vixi0:
Subject to:
∑
s
r¼1
uryr0 ¼ 1
∑
s
r¼1
ur yr0−∑
m
i¼1
vixij≤0; j ¼ 1;…;n:
vi≥εN0; i ¼ 1;…;m
ur ≥εN0; r ¼ 1;…; s
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mathematical model needs to be run n times, once for each one of the
n DMUs.
Appendix B. The Malmquist productivity index
Consider that δt2((xQ,yQ)t1) with t1 = 1.2 and t2 = 1.2 represents the
efﬁciency score of DMUQ operating in time period t1, with reference to
the frontier technology of period t2, under the CRS technology.
Following Tone (2004), the ‘catch-up index’ (C) and the ‘frontier-
shift index’ (F) can be calculated using the following expressions:
C ¼
δ2 xQ ; yQ
 2 
δ1 xQ ; yQ
 1 
F ¼
δ1 xQ ; yQ
 1 
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 2 
δ2 xQ ; yQ
 2 
2
4
3
5
1=2
By multiplying both effects, we obtain the expression for the MPI:
MPI ¼
δ1 xQ ; yQ
 2 
δ1 xQ ; yQ
 1 
δ2 xQ ; yQ
 2 
δ2 xQ ; yQ
 1 
2
4
3
5
1=2
If the MPI is equal to one, it indicates that there was a status quo in
the total factor productivity between the two periods analysed. Alterna-
tively, if the MPI is smaller or greater than one, it indicates that there
was decay or progress, respectively, in the total factor productivity.
Appendix C. The Wilcoxon signed rank test
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was proposed by Wilcoxon (1945).
The following steps are involved in carrying out the Wilcoxon Signed
Rank test to evaluate the statistical signiﬁcance of the changes in perfor-
mance from the period before privatisation to the period after
privatisation:
1) Calculate the performance of each ﬁrm for the period before
privatisation and for the period after privatisation. The scores of per-
formance for each ﬁrm in the two periods constitute a pair of perfor-
mance measures.
2) State the null hypothesis. In our study, the null hypothesis is that the
median difference between the performance observed before
privatisation and the performance observed after privatisation is
equal to zero.
3) For each ﬁrm, calculate the difference between the performance
after privatisation and the performance before privatisation.
4) Rank the absolute value of the paired differences between perfor-
mance measures, attributing one to the smallest difference.
5) Attribute a positive or negative sign to each rank according to the
value of the differences (if it is greater than zero, attribute a positive
sign, if it is smaller than zero, attribute a negative sign). If the differ-
ence is null, ignore these observations and adjust the sample size
accordingly.
6) Calculate the sums of the ranks of the positive differences and the
sum of the ranks of the negative differences, and choose the smallest
sum of ranks.
7) Compare the value observed for the smallest sum of ranks with the
critical value for theWilcoxon Signed Rank test, in order to calculate
the probability of observing such a value (or a more extreme value)
for the sum of ranks. Despite having formulated the research hy-
potheses with regards to improvements in performance after partial
privatisation,we have used two-tailed tests in order to avoid the risk
of failing to detect a negative effect.References
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